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This paper is an analysis of the impact of diﬀerent bargaining regimes on ﬁrm-speciﬁc
wages and wage dispersion. In recent years, ﬁrms in Germany favored more ﬂexible than
collective bargained wages. Opening clauses were introduced to combine collective bargain-
ing and ﬂexible adaptation of e.g. wages to ﬁrm-speciﬁc needs. In an own survey, it was
evaluated whether central collective agreements contain these opening clauses. Then, the
gathered information about opening clauses were linked to the Salary and Wage Structure
Survey 2001.
Focussing on central bargaining agreements, it has been tested whether bargained
wages and wage dispersion diﬀer under opened central bargaining coverage from that of
non-opened central bargaining regimes. While wages with collective bargaining regimes
tend to be higher, it could be found that wage dispersion under opened central collective
bargaining coverage is slightly wider compared to non-opened central bargaining regime.
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An ongoing debate on decentralizing collective bargaining in Germany has prompted a lot of
research on central collective bargaining coverage (cf. e.g. Lehmann 2002; Kohaut and Schnabel
2003; Fitzenberger and Franz 1999a,b, 2001). Nevertheless, earlier empirical studies (cf. e.g.
Gerlach and Stephan 2002, 2005; Bechtel et al. 2004; Guertzgen 2005) distinguish only three
regimes of bargaining coverage. So far, the existence of opening clauses within central bargain-
ing agreements has not been considered about. As oﬃcial data does neither provide information
about the existence of opening clauses within a central bargaining agreement nor if a ﬁrm pays
wages according to an opening clause, in an own survey it was examined if central collective
bargaining agreements contain opening clauses. So, one is able to diﬀer between ﬁrms under
opened and non-opened central collective bargaining coverage.
Since the 1990’s the system of collective bargaining has been criticized to be insuﬃciently ﬂex-
ible towards international competition and technological change (cf. Artus 2001). Throughout
the political discussion, employers have postulated a shift towards a decentralized bargaining
system (cf. Bispinck 2003). In recent years, a lot of ﬁrms abolished central collective agree-
ments and bargained either at ﬁrm-level or with each employee individually. In consequence,
the bargaining parties developed ﬂexible elements called opening or hardship clauses allowing
wage or working-time adaptations at the ﬁrm-level. Diﬀerent types and diﬀerent ways of reg-
ulation exist. Anyway, the application of an opening clause decentralizes the central collective
bargaining regime. According to Fitzenberger and Franz (2001) there is no need to shift from
central to ﬁrm-speciﬁc bargaining system, but collective agreements should generally implement
ﬂexible elements. So far, opening clauses have been introduced to numerous collective bargain-
ing agreements. In their studies on opening clauses Bispinck and WSI-Tarifarchiv (1999, 2003,
2004) report of more than 100 collective agreements containing ﬂexible elements. A common
element of most ﬂexible provisions are employment guarantees on ﬁrm level when introducing
opening clauses.
More ﬂexible collective agreements do not ensure a reduction of unemployment, but might help
to secure existing employment (cf. Fitzenberger and Franz 1999a, 2001). The establishment
survey developed by Franz et al. (2000) emphasizes this hypothesis from an employee’s point
of view. The majority of workers would accept wage reduction only to safeguard their own
jobs and not to create new jobs. Hence, ﬂexible elements within central collective bargaining
agreements are accepted by employees if ﬁrms guarantee existing employment.
As already mentioned above, empirical studies distinguish only between three bargaining regimes.
Besides, central collective bargaining having a very heterogenous structure is neglected and cen-
tral agreements are regarded as a whole. Due to the fact that central agreements can be more
or less ﬂexible, the ﬁrst step of research was to identify central agreements with and without
1opening clauses. In this survey, information on every opening clause was gathered through a
text evaluation1 that is based on more than 90 central collective agreements which were kindly
provided by the Ministry of Labor and Social Aﬀairs Baden-Wuerttemberg. For the ﬁrst time,
it is possible to enrich common oﬃcial data with information on ﬂexible provisions. Here, eval-
uation data is linked to the Salary and Wage Structure Survey. My attention is focussed on the
analysis of wages and their dispersion using additional information about central agreements
to get a deeper understanding of the eﬀects of more or less ﬂexible bargaining agreements.
Some studies for Germany analyzing the eﬀects of the bargaining regime on wages and their
dispersion already exist(cf. Gerlach and Stephan 2002; Bechtel et al. 2004). These studies found
signiﬁcant results: generally speaking, determining wages more ﬂexibly leads on average to a
lower wage level but wage dispersion increases. Now, with additional information about opening
clauses within a collective agreement it is possible to separate central collective agreements into
two subgroups. Each establishment under central collective agreements is assigned either to
the ﬂexible group (with opening clauses) or to the inﬂexible group (without opening clauses).
The analyze of the impact bargaining regimes have, now uses four subgroups: ﬁrms under
individual, ﬁrm-speciﬁc or collective bargaining coverage with or without opening clauses.
In section 2 a short overview of the German bargaining system is given focussing on ﬂexible
components in collective agreements. In section 3 the theoretical background will be introduced.
Section 4 gives a description of the data and then section 5 will present the empirical ﬁndings.
In section 6 conclusions as well as suggests on further research in this ﬁeld are drawn.
2 The German Wage Bargaining System
A main characteristic of the German bargaining system is the right to free collective bargaining,
i.e. government-independent regulations of work terms negotiated by employers and employ-
ees. This principle is laid down by the German constitution and has been leading to large
organizations representing employers and employees respectively.
Two main levels of wage and working-time determination are to be distinguished. At ﬁrst,
wages and working-time can be negotiated at the collective level. More precisely, a collective of
employees carries out negotiations with either a single employer or an employers’ association.
Collective agreements can therefore be ﬁrm-speciﬁc in the ﬁrst case or central in the second.
The conclusions of those collective agreements are legally valid and binding for all associated
1 My survey data contains a large set of variables on opening clauses in diﬀerent central agreements. In this
paper I will only use information whether opening clauses are generally provided or not. Heinbach (2005)
presents a short overview on the data.
2members, employers as well as employees. At second, it is possible to determine wages and
working-time between an single employee and his employer individually.
Until the 1990’s, central collective agreements dominated the bargaining system (Kohaut and
Schnabel 2003; Schnabel et al. 2005). By majority, these were and still are negotiated re-
gionally between an industry-wide union and its corresponding employers’ association. These
collective agreements are only binding for union members, but employers apply them to non-
union employees as well. There are exceptions of this rule. In case the Federal Ministry of
Labor declares a central agreement to be generally binding, all ﬁrms even the non-associated
ﬁrms have to apply it to all employees.
The need of a ﬂexible adjustment of working-time and wages to ﬁrm-speciﬁc particularities has
led to a rise of ﬁrm-speciﬁc collective agreements (Kohaut and Schnabel 2003; Ochel 2005).
In response, many central collective agreements were incorporated with the so-called opening
or hardship clauses (cf. Bispinck 2003). Opening clauses allow ﬁrm-speciﬁc adjustments of
working-time and payment modalities. Usually, these are negotiated between the employer and
the work council. Hardship clauses are normally negotiated between the collective bargaining
parties e.g. in situations in which ﬁrms are close to bankruptcy (cf. Guertzgen 2005).
Especially wage-setting is no longer restricted only to the centralized level. In fact, there are
some possibilities to adjust wages ﬁrm-speciﬁcally. So far, each ﬁrm under central collective
wage coverage has been able to pay higher wages compared to the bargained wages due to the
legal principle allowing deviations in favor of employees. Within lately developments, adjusting
wages account of employees is to be more and more permitted also.
Firms are often forced to lay oﬀ workers when threatened with certain circumstances such as
impeding bankruptcy or though competition. However, ﬁrms are capable of improving their
situation by the possibility to cut their workers wages and thus they can guarantee existing
employment at least temporarily. The cut of wages is possible by postponing the point of vaca-
tion or Christmas bonuses payments by several months. This is a more ﬂexible adaptation on
the ﬁrm level than cutting down bonuses altogether since that would cause an actual reduction
of the wage level. In some cases, opening clauses permit to postpone pay rates increases by
several months or even withdraw from a former rise. Therefore, the overall wage level within
an establishment can decrease. Nevertheless, there are central collective bargaining agreements
not allowing such ﬂexible adjustments.
33 Theoretical Background
Until now, there is a lack of theoretical models describing the German bargaining framework as
a whole (cf. Pfeiﬀer 2003, p. 63). Therefore, this section collects some arguments why unions
want to rise wages and reduce wage dispersion at the same time (Freeman 1982). However,
some studies ﬁnd out that the unions wage eﬀects are weaken due to recent developments such
as e.g. reorganization of work (Lindbeck and Snower 2001) or skill-biased technical change
(Acemolgu et al. 2001). Besides, there is already a theoretical framework to describe the eﬀects
of opening clauses on central bargained wages integrating insider-outsider aspects (Fitzenberger
and Franz 1999a,b).
The bargained wage unions behavior has a ﬁrst increasing eﬀect, as unions collect management-
relevant informations among their members a lot more easily than employers can do on their
own. Consequently, compared to individual workers, unions have a more powerfull position
in bargaining negotiations. Thus, unions improve their members living conditions demanding
higher wages. In particular, low-skilled workers do proﬁt more from their union membership
regarding their wage increase compared to that of high skilled workers (Card 1996; Lemieux
1998). But especially those high skilled workers are likely to cancel union membership, when
wage dispersion gets too small (Acemolgu et al. 2001).
To strengthen union members’ solidarity and their organizational unity, a uniform wage struc-
ture within and across ﬁrms is favored by unions. Demanding "equal pay for equal work",
unions want to attach wages to jobs, while withdrawing supervisors inﬂuence on wage-setting.
Therefore, the inequality between workers in the same occupational group nearly disappears.
Furthermore, wage dispersion within a ﬁrm decreases.
Assuming that the unions’ policy refers to the median worker, it is feasible that the median
wage is equal to the mean wage to circumvent the wage redistribution demanded by workers.
To reach an equality of mean and median wage, the wage gain for lower paid workers might
be relatively higher, so that the wage distribution compresses. As future wages are uncertain,
risk-avers workers prefer a more compressed wage structure. So, union behavior and preferences
lead to higher wages and to a compression of the wage distribution.
The central question in this paper is how wages react when introducing ﬂexible elements such
as opening or hardship clauses. In their theoretical study Fitzenberger and Franz (1999a) have
analyzed the eﬀects of an introduction of opening clauses on wages and employment within a
model regarding insider-outsider aspects. The overall wage eﬀect after the introduction is not
clear, as union will demand higher wages from all ﬁrms, although some of the ﬁrms will apply
the opening clauses immediately causing decreasing wages then.
4Following Fitzenberger and Franz (1999a), the introduction of an opening clause allowing ﬁrm-
speciﬁc adaptation of wages, could increasce the collective bargained wage. Afterwards some
ﬁrms will apply the opening clause and therefore reduce wages ﬁrm-speciﬁcally. This will aﬀect
the overall wage level and wage dispersion. At ﬁrst the overall wage level decreases, but the new
wage level could be less or more than the wage level before the introduction. Wage dispersion
will increase if only some ﬁrms will lower their wages and others will pay the higher bargained
wages. But in a situation where almost every ﬁrm will adapt opening clauses e.g. in a overall
economic crisis, wage dispersion will not increase.
This paper focuses on following hypotheses. At ﬁrst, wages under opened central bargaining
coverage are lower than under non-opened central bargaining coverage. At second, wage disper-
sion of central bargaining agreements with opening clauses is wider than of central agreements
without opening clauses. Last but not least, individually agreed wages compared to collective
bargained are lower, whereas their wage dispersion is wider.
4 Data
This paper uses a representative cross-section survey of ﬁrms in the German state of Baden-
Wuerttemberg, the Salary and Wage Structure Survey ("Verdienststrukturerhebung"). It con-
tains representative information about ﬁrms and their workers. A random sample stratiﬁed by
industry, ﬁrm size and region is drawn by the Baden-Wuerttemberg Statistical Oﬃce covering
every ﬁrm with at least 10 employees in the manufacturing sector and in parts of the services
sector.
In 2002, about 3,000 ﬁrms reported data wiht approximately 110,000 employees. These data
contain information about individual workers’ characteristics like gross and net compensation
in October 2001, annual compensation, working-time, gender, age, tenure, education and occu-
pation. Unfortunately, information about ﬁrm characteristics are rare: only ﬁrm size, number
of male and female workers and number of blue-collar workers are available. Due to the fact
that the Salary and Wage Structure Survey2 is a Linked-Employer-Employee-Dataset (LEE)3,
it is possible to control for both individual and ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects.
It is focused on detailed information about collective bargaining agreements. For each worker,
2 Detailed information about method, organization and empirical results can be found in Frank-Bosch (2003)
for Germany or Mödinger (2003) and Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Württemberg (2004) for Baden-
Wuerttemberg. A detailed data description including data access for the Salary and Wage Structure Survey
1995 in Lower Saxony is given by Stephan (2001). Her remarks are also valid for the used data.
3 For a more detailed survey of this kind of data see Abowd and Kramarz (1999).
5the individually binding collective bargaining agreement is reported4. Besides the type of
bargaining regime (i.e. ﬁrm-speciﬁc or collective agreement), it is possible to identify the
precise collective bargaining agreement.
In addition, it is possible to enrich the Salary and Wage Structure Survey with information taken
out of the collective bargaining agreements. Since there are many diﬀerent collective bargaining
agreements5, The sample is composed of the manufacturing sector. Only full-time employees
(at least 30 working-hours a week) in ﬁrms from 100 to 10,000 workers are considered. Thus,
data contain 19,100 blue-collar and more than 9,900 white-collar workers. There are around
660 ﬁrms in the manufacturing, energy and construction sector. All ﬁrms consist of at least
5 observations in the sample. Every ﬁrm pays wages either according to a central collective
bargaining, a ﬁrm-speciﬁc or an individual agreement. Members of executive staﬀ as well as
apprentices and part-time workers were dropped out of the data to obtain a more homogenous
sample.
In preparation to this study, central collective bargaining agreements6were evaluated with re-
gard to opening and hardship clauses. Detailed information about diﬀerent types and designs
of opening clauses were gathered. These opening clauses deal with wages and working time
respectively . In addition to the year of introduction of each opening clause, data provide
information on how ﬁrms are able to implement them (Heinbach 2005).
Throughout the study, four groups of wage determination are distinguished:
² individually bargained agreements,
² ﬁrm-speciﬁc agreements,
² collective bargaining agreements without opening clauses and
² collective bargaining agreements with opening clauses.
The ﬁrst two groups have been taken out of the Salary and Wage Structure Survey, while the
others could only be identiﬁed as central collective bargaining agreement. Information about
4 The according agreement to which an employee is hired is reported in the manual of collective bargaining
agreements ("Tariﬂeitband"), which was kindly provided by the Statistical Oﬃce.
5 The Federal Ministry of Labor reports a number of 34,437 collective agreements available for the year 2001.
However, the number of bargaining areas tends to be around 1,100 (cf. Bundesministerium für Arbeit und
Sozialordnung 2002).
6 Central collective agreements texts were kindly provided by the Ministry of Labor and Social Aﬀairs Baden-
Wuerttemberg. A further source has been Bispinck and WSI-Tarifarchiv (2004), that give a detailed survey
of opening clauses in selected branches. Additionally, I analyzed agreements without any ﬂexible elements.
More detailed information about the survey can be found in Heinbach (2005).
6opening clauses is exactly matched to the oﬃcial data using the identiﬁer of the collective
agreement and own evaluation data. In the following, a collective bargaining agreement is
called "without opening clauses" (non-opened) if there are no employer-side possibilities to
adjust wages, vacation or the Christmas bonuses. If a collective bargaining agreement allows a
ﬁrm-speciﬁc adjustment such as lowering or cutting the payment of vacation or the Christmas
bonuses or lowering or cutting a pay increases, such a collective agreement is called "with
opening clauses" (opened).
Unfortunately, there is no information about ﬁrms paying its wages by using an opening clause.
Thus, information only reports if the ﬁrm is able to apply an agreement with or without opening
clauses. A company applying an opening clause is said to pay a lower wage c.p. than one not
applying. However, when interpreting the results, it is to account for the fact that we do
not know if an establishment actually pays lower wages. Nevertheless, the distinction between
agreements with and without opening clauses is helpful to get a deeper understanding on the
impact of opening clauses.
5 Empirical Findings
5.1 Central Collective Bargaining Agreements
At the beginning of the empirical analysis, some descriptive details about the collective bargain-
ing agreements are presented. The importance of collective bargaining declined remarkably over
the time period 1995 to 2001 (cf. table 1). In the manufacturing sector the share of full-time
workers under a collective bargaining regime decreased from 72 % to 61 % over that period.
However, there are some branches with a lower decrease like the energy and water supply indus-
try. Actually, in the chemical industry the collective bargaining coverage of full-time workers
increased in that period.
Table 2 presents an overview on selected central collective bargaining agreements by industry,
separated in groups with and without opening clauses. There are still relevant industries in
which the central agreements are not yet ﬂexible adapted. Comparing these industries in table
2 and the decline in collective bargaining (table 1), one cannot assume an obvious relationsship
between the openness of the central bargaining agreement in an industry and the decline in
bargaining coverage.
Besides this, the central agreement landscape is not homogenous. There are numerous ﬁrms
within the same industry not applying the industry level bargaining agreement. From a histor-
ical point of view, those companies used to belong to another industry sector. In the meantime,
7they changed their industry sector, but not their membership in the employers association. So
they apply another bargaining agreement as their competitors. As complete information about
the applied collective agreement within each ﬁrm is available, this fact is interesting but not
relevant for the present study.
5.2 Descriptive Statistics
In table 3, mean and standard deviation of the log gross hourly wages under four diﬀerent
bargaining regimes are presented, separate for blue-collar and white-collar workers respectively.
In the following analyses, this separation is maintained as there are diﬀerences comparing the
payment of wages and qualiﬁcation groups. Blue-collar workers are paid regarding their labor-
time. Often, they earn bonuses or piecework wage, too. Contrary, white-collar workers earn a
monthly wage. Their overall wages are often higher than those of blue-collar workers.
The mean of the log gross hourly wages of blue-collar as well as that of white-collar workers is
lower if central collective bargaining regimes do have opening clauses. Wages under collective
bargaining coverage are higher than individual agreed wages. The variation coeﬃcient reports
the relative dispersion of the distribution. Relative and absolute dispersion in the blue-collar
workers group are higher if the central collective bargaining regime allows opening clauses, but
are not higher in the white-collar workers’ group. The means in the diﬀerent bargaining regimes
are quite equal, but diﬀer highly signiﬁcant besides those between ﬁrm-speciﬁc agreement and
opened central agreement in the white-collar group.
The empirical distribution of the log gross hourly wages is presented as a kernel density plot7
in ﬁgure 1. Again, four diﬀerent bargaining regimes are separated, for blue-collar and white-
collar workers respectively. Figure 1a) shows the wage level of the blue-collar workers group
with individual agreements being lower than with collective regimes and wage dispersion being
wider. The wage levels of the three collective regimes are quite equal, but wage dispersion
grows in central agreements with opening clauses. In the group of white-collar workers (ﬁgure
1b), the wage levels do not diﬀer much. Wage dispersion is almost equal as well, except for
ﬁrm-speciﬁc agreements. Corresponding to the blue-collar workers wage distribution, the wage
dispersion with ﬁrm-speciﬁc agreements is lower than with other central collective regimes in
the white-collar workers group.
An alternative way to present the wage distribution are box-plots (ﬁgure 2). The plots are once
again separated into four bargaining regimes, blue and white-collar workers respectively.
7 Kernel density is estimated using an Epanechnikov-kernel and following the recommendation of Silverman
(1986) for optimal width.
8The line in the middle of the box represents the median wage, whereas 50% of the observations
have a wage less and 50% have a wage higher than that value. The medians of individual
agreements are lowest within each the blue- and white-collar workers group. Blue-collar workers
as well as white-collar workers with central collective agreements without opening clauses have
therefore the highest median wages. The median wages of central agreements with opening
clauses tend to be lower than the median wages of ﬁrm-speciﬁc agreements.
Comparing the inter-quartile-range, as the wage diﬀerence of the central 50 % in its regime,
evidence that individually agreed wages tend to have a wider dispersion is found. Furthermore,
the inter-quartile-ranges of opened central agreements are larger than of ﬁrm-speciﬁc collective
agreements. Other remarkable points are the outliers appearing in all boxes. One will have to
account to them, when computing multivariate statistics in the next section.
Descriptive statistics report the general eﬀects of collective bargaining regimes. Wage levels
tend to be higher with lower dispersion. Distinguishing three types of collective bargaining, the
eﬀects are not that clear. Comparing central collective agreements with and without opening
clauses, it can be found that the level of wages in the opened regime tend to be higher, but
the dispersion remains ambiguous. At the beginning, opened and non-opened branches were
presented. Therefore, the results for wages under opened or non-opened central bargaining
coverage may be inﬂuenced strongly . However, as opening clauses are characteristic for the
central bargaining agreement and not for the industry as a whole, there is no strong endogeneity
problem between central bargaining agreement and industry. Furthermore, there are industries
with ﬁrms applying agreements with opening clauses and other ﬁrms within the same industry
applying agreements without opening clauses at the same time. To get deeper understanding
of the eﬀects of opening clauses, multivariate analyses explaining the level and the dispersion
of the log gross hourly wages are presented in the next section.
5.3 Multivariate Statistics
5.3.1 Model and Variables




i¯ + "i (1)
The vector xi represents exogenous variables in ﬁrm i, ¯ is the vector of coeﬃcients to be
estimated and "i is an identically independently normal-distributed error containing all impacts
which are not explicitly in the model. Ordinary least squares are used while accounting for
9heteroscedasticity estimating heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (cf. White 1980).
Furthermore, robust and median regressions are done to check whether the results are robust
or inﬂuenced by the outliers found in the descriptive analysis (cf. ﬁgure 2).




i¯ + "i: (2)
Exogenous variables are represented by zi, whereas ¯ is the vector of coeﬃcients to be estimated.
Ordinary least squares as well as robust and median regression are computed to check robustness
of the estimates.
In the models, a large set of variables is used, which is described shortly . The human capital
within each ﬁrm is expressed through the mean of years of schooling. Shares of diﬀerent
qualiﬁcation levels account for qualiﬁcation structure within each ﬁrm. The mean of tenure is
an indicator for ﬁrm-speciﬁc accumulated human capital (cf. Becker 1975). Positive signs are
expected for all human capital coeﬃcients, as far as an increasing human capital should aﬀect
wages in a positive way.
To control for seniority eﬀects, the ﬁrm-speciﬁc mean of the age of the workers and the age
squared are used. As gross hourly wages include premia and bonuses for working time on
sundays or during night, shares of workers working at that time are used. As the payment-type
of the wage, i.e. piecework or bonus wage or a mixture, inﬂuences the amount of the wage,
the share of people being payed are taken to control for these eﬀects. Positive eﬀects of these
individual variables are expected, whereas the coeﬃcients of the squared variables should be
negative.
To control for gender wage discrimination, the share of female workers within each ﬁrm is
computed. Another important explaining variable is the ﬁrm size. To account for this, dummy-
variables for each category of ﬁrm size are used. As productivity might grow with ﬁrm size, a
positive sign for the coeﬃcients are expected. The industrial branch in which a ﬁrm is situated
has an impact on wages. Using a two-digit sector classiﬁcation, general eﬀects in diﬀerent
industrial branches are taken into account.
Last but not least, dummy-variables for the four bargaining regimes were assigned. By this,
the eﬀects of opened central wage agreements can be identiﬁed. Individual agreements will
be the reference category. For the collective bargaining regime coeﬃcients, a positive sign is
expected, as union power should increase wages. In a second speciﬁcation, only workers under
central collective bargaining coverage are being used. So, it can be identiﬁed whether opened
10or non-opened central collective agreements have a diﬀerent impact on wages and the wage
dispersion.
In the following, the estimates of regression analysis for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc mean of log hourly
wages (equation 1) as well as the wage dispersion (equation 2) in the manufacturing sector
in Baden-Wuerttemberg are presented. Again, blue and white-collar workers are separated,
because some variables like qualiﬁcation group or wage regime diﬀer in the two groups.
5.3.2 Analysis of the Determinants of the Wage Level
Table 4 presents the estimates for blue-collar workers, table 5 for white-collar workers. In all
models, industry eﬀects are controlled for, but these estimates are left out in the tables.
Blue-collar workers’ ﬁrm-speciﬁc wages under opened central collective bargaining coverage are
signiﬁcantly negative inﬂuenced. Whereas the eﬀect of the other collective bargaining regimes
remains insigniﬁcant. Compared to their colleagues with individually agreed wages, blue-collar
workers with opened central collective agreements earn c.p. 2.9% less on average. Turning
to the estimates for the white-collar workers, the coeﬃcients for collective bargaining are all
positive and signiﬁcant. White-collar workers under collective bargaining coverage earn c.p.
3.9 % to 5.1% higher wages than their colleagues with individually agreed wages.
To focus on the hypothesis, whether opened and non-opened central bargaining regimes diﬀer,
estimates for workers under central bargaining coverage are presented in table 6 and 7. In
all models the inﬂuence of opening clauses is negative. For the blue-collar workers group
the inﬂuence is highly signiﬁcant. ﬁrm-speciﬁc wages under an opened collective bargaining
agreement are about 6.9% to 7.7% less than under a non-opened collective agreement. This
eﬀect is less with the white-collar group and in the most models insigniﬁcant. Reﬀering to the
robust regression the eﬀect is about 2.7% average wage reduction.
In principle, the coeﬃcients of the other variables have the expected signs. A higher qualiﬁcation
leads to signiﬁcantly higher wages. Furthermore, wages increase if qualiﬁcation arises from
group to group. Workers’ tenure has a positive impact on the wage, which looses strength
while increasing, as the coeﬃcient of squared tenure is signiﬁcant negative. More years of
schooling will increase wages too. Age increases the wage only for the white-collar workers.
The strength of a wage increase decreases as the coeﬃcient of the squared age is negative.
Blue-collar workers’ age has no signiﬁcant impact on the wage8. Although there are only full-
time workers within the data and all other variables are kept constant, ﬁrms with a higher share
of female workers pay a lower wage. Compared to a time wage, wages increase while the share
8 Mödinger (2003) reports analogous ﬁndings in descriptive statistics with the same data.
11of workers with incentive wages arise. Working on Sundays or during night has positive but not
signiﬁcant impact on the wage. Firm-size is another signiﬁcant factor determining the wage
level. Obviously, wages are higher the larger the ﬁrm. Distinguishing two subgroups out of
the ﬁrms with 100 to 499 workers, the coeﬃcient of the ﬁrms with 500 to 999 workers becomes
signiﬁcant. Probably the wages within the smallest ﬁrms are too heterogenous compared to
the other groups. Industry eﬀects are heterogenous, too. Compared to the manufacturing of
transport equipment, which is a high wage industry and deals as the reference category, all
coeﬃcients are negative. So, the industry branches have an inﬂuence on the wage level.
5.3.3 Analysis of the Determinants of the Wage Dispersion
The analysis of the wage dispersion takes two steps. In section 5.2, a higher dispersion with
individually agreed wages can be found. Consequently, the dispersion is lower with collective
bargained wages which can be caused by lower dispersion within a single ﬁrm or a lower dis-
persion between the ﬁrms. Both can be a result of the collective bargaining principal "equal
pay for equal work".
In an onefactorial analysis of variance, internal and external variance under diﬀerent bargaining
regimes are distinguished. Afterwards, the wage dispersion will be explained using ordinary
least squares as mentioned above (equation 2).
Figure 3 presents an onefactorial analysis of variance. It can be shown dispersion within the
ﬁrms to be a big share of total dispersion. However, within-dispersion with opened central
agreements is signiﬁcantly higher than with non-opened central agreements. Obviously, within-
dispersion is a lot higher for white-collar workers than for the blue-collar workers. The lower
dispersion under collective bargaining coverage can be explained mainly through the lower
dispersion between the ﬁrms. Within the blue-collar group, between-dispersion with opened
and non-opened central bargaining agreements diﬀers signiﬁcant.
The estimates of the wage dispersion are reported in table 4 and 5. For the impact of the
bargaining regime, negative signs would be expected, as collective bargaining leads to a wage
compression. The blue-collar workers estimates are signiﬁcant negative. Furthermore, the
coeﬃcients for the regime without opening clauses is smaller than that of the regime with
opening clauses. Consequently wage dispersion under collective bargaining regime is not that
wide as with individually agreed wages. Estimates for the white-collar workers group are all
positive, but also insigniﬁcant. That means, that collective agreed wages tend to wider the
wage dispersion.
Comparing blue-collar workers under central bargaining coverage, the coeﬃcient for the opened
regime is negative but insigniﬁcant.
12To focus on the hypothesis, whether opened and non-opened central bargaining regimes diﬀer
regarding the wage dispersion, estimates for workers under central bargaining coverage are
presented in table 6 and 7. The coeﬃcients of opened bargaining regime are insigniﬁcant and
positive with the white-collar workers’ group but negative with teh blue-collar workers’ group.
The other coeﬃcients have mainly the expected sign. A lot of variables have no signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on the wage dispersion. Increasing human capital will wider the dispersion of blue-
collar workers. Positive signs can be found with age and tenure. This means, if the workers
mean age within a single ﬁrm increases, wage and wage within-dispersion increases too.
It seems, that it is the same with the ﬁrm size eﬀect. A slightly negative sign is found, but
insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients. So, in larger ﬁrms, wages tend to be higher, but this does not aﬀect
the within wage dispersion, all other variable kept constant.
Summing up, a large number of signiﬁcant variables could not be found to explain the wage
dispersion. The bargaining regime in the blue-collar workers’ group is one main determinant of
the wage dispersion, as descriptive statistics and the onefactorial analysis pointed out. Besides
this, the wage dispersion with central collective bargaining agreements with opening clauses
does not diﬀer from that of central agreements without opening clauses.
6 Conclusions and Outlook
In this analysis, four diﬀerent regimes of bargaining were distinguished. Using German linked-
employer-employee data and focussing on central collective agreements, this paper analyzed if
opening clauses aﬀect the wages and wage dispersion remarkably.
Empirical results point out that wages under collective bargaining coverage tend to be higher
and less dispersed. Compared to other studies using the same or analogous data (Bechtel et al.
2004; Gerlach and Stephan 2002, 2005), similar eﬀects of the bargaining regime could be found.
Furthermore, this paper concentrates on whether wages under central collective coverage with
opening clauses diﬀer from those without opening clauses. In a ﬁrst approach, it could be found
that the wage level under opened central agreements is lower than under non-opened central
ones. Considering the theoretical eﬀects of the introduction of an opening clause (Fitzenberger
and Franz 1999a), the results could be interpreted that a bunch of ﬁrms apply negotiated
opening clauses without knowing exactly if speciﬁc ﬁrms do so. So it can be concluded that
opening clauses are likely to be applied at the ﬁrm-level, lowering the wage level.
In this paper, central collective agreements are distinguished in only two groups, however, eval-
uation data would provide more detailed information about opening clauses of central collective
13bargaining agreements. Thus, a "degree of opening" could be created, diﬀerentiating a more
detailed intensity of opening clauses. In fact, opening clauses are very heterogenous as nego-
tiations on implementing them can take place either on ﬁrm-level or on industry-level. In an
additional analysis it could be analyzed if the more detailed information about the intensity of
opening clauses will improve the ﬁndings.
Unfortunately, we do not know if a speciﬁc ﬁrm applies an opening clause or not. Thus, the
analysis focuses on industries with opened central agreements. Consequently, the estimates for
the diﬀerent regimes are not that clear. It can be presumed, that there are a number of ﬁrms
within opened collective agreement group, paying wages above the originally bargained wage.
More precise estimates would be obtained, if data would contain information on teh application
on opening clauses.
Until now, there is a big lack of knowledge within the political discussion concerning the eﬀects
of opening clauses. This paper on opening clauses is a ﬁrst step to get a deeper understanding
of the eﬀects of such ﬂexible clauses. Results imply that more wage ﬂexibility within industry-
level bargaining combines both the advantages of collective bargaining and ﬁrm-speciﬁc cir-
cumstances, so that now a decentralized but still collective bargaining regime is said to adapt
better towards future challenges.
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16A Appendix: Tables and Figures
Table 1: Development of collective bargaining agreements (central and ﬁrm-speciﬁc) from 1995
to 2001 in selected industries in Baden-Wuerttemberg - full-time workers (Source: Salary and
Wage Structure Survey 1995, 2001)
Branch of economic activity
Commitment to centralised
wage bargaining agreement
Proportion of employees com-
mitted to wage agreement
1995 2001 Change in
percentage points in %
Manufacturing industry 72:1 61:0 -11:1
Containing
All key industries¤) 75:8 63:9 -11:9
Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metals 61:4 44:5 -16:9
Manufacture of machinery and equipments 79:8 67:6 -12:2
Manufacture of oﬃce machinery and computers, electrical
machinery, precision and optical instruments 65:8 51:1 -14:7
Manufacture of transport equipment 92:7 87:5 -5:2
Manufacture of textiles and clothes 79:7 68:6 -11:1
Chemical industry 71:8 73:9 2:1
Plastic processing industry 47:3 42:0 -5:3
Energy and water supply 91:9 89:9 -2:0
¤) Key industries: manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metals, manufacture of machinery, equipments, oﬃce
machinery, computers, electrical machinery, precision and optical instruments; manufacture of transport equipment
Table 2: Overview on selected industries and central collective agreements with or without
opening clauses in the year 2001 (Source: Own survey)
Branches9with central collective agreements
with opening clauses without opening clauses
Manufacture of textiles and clothes Food and alimentation industry
Manufacture of paper and printing industry Manufacture of transport equipment
Chemical industry Manufacture of metals, machinery
Plastic processing industry and equipments, electrical machinery
Building and construction
9 Note, not all ﬁrms within a branch apply the industry-level collective bargaining agreement (cf. Heinbach
2005)
17Table 3: Descriptive statistics of log gross hourly wages in the manufacturing sector - un-
weighted10 obeservations, Baden-Wuerttemberg, October 2001 (Source: Salary and Wage Struc-
ture Survey 2001)





























mean 2.76 2.64 2.70 2.54 2.99 2.90 2.92 2.79
standard deviation 0.22 0.23 0.19 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.30
variation coeﬃcient 0.080 0.088 0.071 0.097 0.088 0.083 0.079 0.108
number of observations 11047 3205 817 4038 5511 1738 358 2305
number of ﬁrms 372 103 23 151 366 102 24 182
number of collective bargaining
agreements
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b) white-collar workers
Figure 1: Kernel density of log gross hourly wages in the manufacturing sector in Baden-
Wuerttemberg, October 2001 (Source: Salary and Wage Structure Survey 2001)
10Weighted results do only diﬀer slightly from unweighted results.












































Figure 2: Boxplots of log gross hourly wages in the manufacturing sector in Baden-

























intra−firm variance inter−firm variance
Graphs by dummy employees
Figure 3: Decomposition of variance by bargaining regime, Baden-Wuerttemberg, October 2001
(Source: Salary and Wage Structure Survey 2001)
12CBA (w/o OC): central collective bargaining agreement without opening clauses
CBA (with OC): central collective bargaining agreement with opening clauses
FA: ﬁrm-speciﬁc agreement
IA: individual agreement
19Table 4: Regression analysis of mean and dispersion of log gross hourly wage in the blue-collar
workers’ group in the manufacturing sector, Baden-Wuerttemberg, October 2001
(Source: Salary and Wage Structure Survey 2001)
mean of log gross hourly wage standard deviation of log gross hourly wage
OLS robust median OLS robust median
Variables ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) regression regression ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) regression regression
age / 10 -0.011 -0.008 -0.115 0.067 0.063 0.039 0.039 0.071 0.065 0.086
(0.577) (0.669) (0.427) (0.537) (0.576) (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.108) (0.050)** (0.038)**
(age/10)2 0.013 -0.007 -0.007 -0.004 -0.004 -0.006
(0.433) (0.570) (0.599) (0.485) (0.226) (0.208)
tenure / 10 0.085 0.083 0.202 0.157 0.171 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.026 0.025
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.740) (0.734) (0.797) (0.162) (0.279)
(tenure/10)2 -0.039 -0.027 -0.030 -0.000 -0.003 -0.002
(0.003)*** (0.024)** (0.014)** (0.970) (0.368) (0.600)
years of education 0.031 0.030 0.033 0.034 0.040 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.004 -0.004
(0.023)** (0.026)** (0.014)** (0.005)*** (0.001)*** (0.993) (0.998) (0.935) (0.531) (0.615)
share of female workers -0.157 -0.157 -0.153 -0.173 -0.166 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.051 0.062
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
share of high-skilled workers 0.298 0.300 0.295 0.260 0.228 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.025 0.029
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.075)* (0.075)* (0.074)* (0.017)** (0.025)**
share of skilled workers 0.245 0.250 0.242 0.202 0.188 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.010
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.872) (0.884) (0.889) (0.742) (0.441)
share of semi-skilled workers 0.097 0.102 0.096 0.060 0.041 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004
(0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.010)** (0.080)* (0.618) (0.635) (0.633) (0.763) (0.755)
bonus wage 0.047 0.045 0.044 0.054 0.063 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.009 -0.004
(0.034)** (0.041)** (0.046)** (0.008)*** (0.002)*** (0.604) (0.596) (0.633) (0.307) (0.688)
piecework wage 0.094 0.091 0.090 0.129 0.139 -0.015 -0.015 -0.014 -0.017 -0.004
(0.011)** (0.011)** (0.009)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.243) (0.240) (0.279) (0.113) (0.789)
piece rate plus bonuses 0.140 0.130 0.139 0.123 0.125 0.012 0.012 0.010 0.006 0.060
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.152) (0.005)*** (0.646) (0.660) (0.713) (0.878) (0.199)
mixed wage 0.012 0.014 0.012 0.020 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.002
(0.687) (0.653) (0.698) (0.429) (0.870) (0.933) (0.940) (0.939) (0.804) (0.858)
Sunday working 0.095 0.090 0.094 0.062 0.076 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.006
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.000)*** (0.273) (0.282) (0.295) (0.198) (0.594)
night work 0.036 0.034 0.036 0.060 0.062 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.001 -0.004
(0.090)* (0.103) (0.087)* (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.260) (0.255) (0.219) (0.894) (0.646)
ﬁrms with 200 to 499 employees 0.040 0.035 0.032 0.029 0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.010
(0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.010)*** (0.712) (0.733) (0.516) (0.079)*
ﬁrms with 500 to 999 employees 0.026 0.051 0.046 0.047 0.037 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.010 -0.013
(0.071)* (0.001)*** (0.004)*** (0.001)*** (0.011)** (0.507) (0.679) (0.627) (0.091)* (0.089)*
ﬁrms with more than 1000 employees 0.071 0.097 0.089 0.084 0.074 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.007
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.646) (0.844) (0.801) (0.622) (0.313)
dummy CBA with opening clauses -0.024 -0.028 -0.028 -0.029 -0.025 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.021
(0.156) (0.098)* (0.086)* (0.070)* (0.112) (0.030)** (0.030)** (0.029)** (0.013)** (0.014)**
dummy CBA w/o opening clauses 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.016 0.033 -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 -0.025 -0.025
(0.594) (0.597) (0.581) (0.332) (0.047)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.005)***
ﬁrm-speciﬁc agreement 0.013 0.010 0.015 0.000 -0.027 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.012 0.003
(0.657) (0.753) (0.627) (0.993) (0.255) (0.352) (0.349) (0.362) (0.259) (0.837)
Constant 2.175 2.154 2.280 1.930 1.886 0.100 0.099 0.095 0.094 0.086
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 648 648 648 648 648 644 644 644 644 644
R-squared 0.647 0.653 0.659 0.682 0.167 0.167 0.168 0.185
Adj R-squared 0.628 0.634 0.639 0.663 0.122 0.121 0.119 0.137
Pseudo R-squared 0.441 0.102
Robust p values in parentheses; * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
20Table 5: Regression analysis of mean and dispersion of log gross hourly wage in the white-collar
workers’ group in the manufacturing sector, Baden-Wuerttemberg, October 2001
(Source: Salary and Wage Structure Survey 2001)
mean of log gross hourly wage standard deviation of log gross hourly wage
OLS robust median OLS robust median
Variables ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) regression regression ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) regression regression
age / 10 0.037 0.039 0.293 0.309 0.380 0.058 0.058 0.193 0.243 0.217
(0.009)*** (0.006)*** (0.002)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
(age/10)2 -0.031 -0.033 -0.042 -0.015 -0.020 -0.018
(0.008)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.003)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)***
tenure / 10 0.041 0.039 0.053 0.046 0.044 -0.003 -0.003 0.010 0.012 0.035
(0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.150) (0.108) (0.106) (0.699) (0.706) (0.715) (0.529) (0.180)
(tenure/10)2 -0.004 0.002 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.007
(0.756) (0.771) (0.687) (0.770) (0.636) (0.211)
years of education 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.029 0.032 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.008
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.057)* (0.056)* (0.066)* (0.004)*** (0.016)**
share of female workers -0.233 -0.231 -0.222 -0.234 -0.248 0.026 0.026 0.016 0.016 0.020
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.153) (0.154) (0.373) (0.271) (0.288)
share of employees 0.594 0.602 0.586 0.453 0.485 -0.252 -0.253 -0.236 -0.279 -0.272
with specialized knowledge (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
share of employees 0.679 0.686 0.671 0.537 0.567 -0.288 -0.289 -0.271 -0.315 -0.317
with self-employed activity (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
share of employees 0.402 0.408 0.404 0.284 0.339 -0.216 -0.217 -0.207 -0.259 -0.254
w/o decision-making power (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.008)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
remuneration for technical activity 0.018 0.016 0.014 0.028 0.030 0.012 0.012 0.016 0.007 0.008
(0.367) (0.416) (0.477) (0.114) (0.084)* (0.368) (0.365) (0.250) (0.522) (0.592)
Sunday working 0.049 0.053 0.044 0.046 0.096 0.030 0.030 0.031 0.019 0.028
(0.232) (0.194) (0.260) (0.340) (0.025)** (0.349) (0.352) (0.323) (0.509) (0.439)
night work 0.055 0.053 0.059 0.050 0.045 -0.031 -0.031 -0.036 -0.029 -0.034
(0.185) (0.200) (0.138) (0.279) (0.292) (0.304) (0.305) (0.216) (0.302) (0.367)
ﬁrms with 200 to 499 employees 0.020 0.021 0.022 0.024 -0.001 -0.003 -0.009 -0.009
(0.090)* (0.067)* (0.034)** (0.015)** (0.894) (0.686) (0.153) (0.297)
ﬁrms with 500 to 999 employees 0.025 0.038 0.037 0.044 0.041 0.007 0.006 0.003 -0.012 -0.014
(0.082)* (0.019)** (0.023)** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.412) (0.511) (0.771) (0.122) (0.196)
ﬁrms with more than 1000 employees 0.053 0.066 0.065 0.068 0.067 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.014 -0.015
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.596) (0.613) (0.428) (0.075)* (0.165)
dummy CBA with opening clauses 0.044 0.044 0.041 0.021 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.031 0.019
(0.015)** (0.016)** (0.024)** (0.177) (0.439) (0.431) (0.429) (0.466) (0.001)*** (0.111)
dummy CBA w/o opening clauses 0.044 0.043 0.039 0.047 0.035 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.015 0.007
(0.026)** (0.026)** (0.045)** (0.003)*** (0.019)** (0.723) (0.721) (0.677) (0.108) (0.562)
ﬁrm-speciﬁc agreement 0.051 0.049 0.043 0.033 0.051 0.014 0.014 0.019 0.025 0.018
(0.025)** (0.034)** (0.063)* (0.140) (0.018)** (0.342) (0.341) (0.214) (0.061)* (0.331)
Constant 1.869 1.851 1.363 1.493 1.302 0.373 0.374 0.346 0.385 0.388
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 673 673 673 673 673 658 658 658 658 658
R-squared 0.697 0.698 0.704 0.732 0.181 0.182 0.196 0.281
Adj R-squared 0.683 0.684 0.689 0.718 0.142 0.141 0.154 0.243
Pseudo R-squared 0.475 0.146
Robust p values in parentheses; * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
21Table 6: Blue-collar workers’ group under central collective bargaining coverage: Regression
analysis of mean and dispersion of logarithmised gross hourly wage in the manufacturing sector,
Baden-Wuerttemberg, October 2001 (Source: Salary and Wage Structure Survey 2001)
mean of log gross hourly wage standard deviation of log gross hourly wage
OLS robust median OLS robust median
Variables ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) regression regression ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) regression regression
age / 10 -0.024 -0.018 -0.223 -0.003 0.004 0.042 0.042 0.062 0.065 0.091
(0.329) (0.442) (0.201) (0.980) (0.976) (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.214) (0.069)* (0.068)*
(age/10)2 0.025 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.006
(0.205) (0.961) (0.818) (0.678) (0.226) (0.287)
tenure / 10 0.073 0.071 0.182 0.127 0.128 0.004 0.004 0.011 0.025 0.028
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.702) (0.703) (0.631) (0.223) (0.316)
(tenure/10)2 -0.036 -0.021 -0.018 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.008)*** (0.089)* (0.163) (0.770) (0.589) (0.778)
years of education 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.021 0.013 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.000 -0.007
(0.665) (0.707) (0.629) (0.112) (0.375) (0.671) (0.669) (0.688) (0.973) (0.477)
share of female workers -0.147 -0.147 -0.143 -0.165 -0.138 0.056 0.056 0.055 0.043 0.033
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.074)*
share of high-skilled workers 0.278 0.282 0.284 0.235 0.210 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.021 0.020
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.041)** (0.041)** (0.044)** (0.085)* (0.236)
share of skilled workers 0.212 0.220 0.215 0.181 0.194 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.005
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.983) (0.985) (0.969) (0.835) (0.778)
share of semi-skilled workers 0.068 0.076 0.080 0.040 0.050 -0.020 -0.020 -0.021 -0.019 -0.010
(0.066)* (0.034)** (0.034)** (0.185) (0.118) (0.177) (0.181) (0.160) (0.164) (0.594)
bonus wage 0.069 0.065 0.062 0.065 0.078 -0.015 -0.015 -0.014 -0.007 -0.014
(0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.007)*** (0.003)*** (0.001)*** (0.103) (0.106) (0.123) (0.436) (0.306)
piecework wage 0.113 0.109 0.107 0.115 0.124 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.015 -0.012
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.332) (0.335) (0.364) (0.182) (0.437)
piece rate plus bonuses 0.092 0.082 0.099 0.075 0.070 -0.052 -0.052 -0.054 -0.059 -0.066
(0.139) (0.159) (0.125) (0.492) (0.272) (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.213) (0.028)**
mixed wage 0.002 0.010 0.007 0.013 -0.013 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.021 -0.025
(0.950) (0.759) (0.834) (0.662) (0.667) (0.057)* (0.058)* (0.056)* (0.089)* (0.148)
Sunday working 0.109 0.105 0.107 0.062 0.101 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.002 -0.002
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.000)*** (0.960) (0.959) (0.950) (0.863) (0.863)
night work 0.028 0.025 0.028 0.056 0.057 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.237) (0.283) (0.226) (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.387) (0.388) (0.419) (0.461) (0.602)
ﬁrms with 200 to 499 employees 0.050 0.045 0.046 0.038 0.000 -0.000 -0.006 -0.006
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.004)*** (0.972) (0.995) (0.281) (0.452)
ﬁrms with 500 to 999 employees 0.001 0.034 0.028 0.036 0.017 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.006 -0.004
(0.968) (0.046)** (0.093)* (0.015)** (0.300) (0.671) (0.699) (0.737) (0.363) (0.642)
ﬁrms with more than 1000 employees 0.054 0.089 0.082 0.085 0.071 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.004
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.623) (0.666) (0.697) (0.865) (0.623)
dummy CBA with opening clauses -0.073 -0.077 -0.077 -0.069 -0.082 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.010
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.358) (0.361) (0.360) (0.232) (0.343)
Constant 2.529 2.487 2.820 2.250 2.376 0.086 0.086 0.083 0.094 0.077
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.003)***
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 475 475 475 475 475 472 472 472 472 472
R-squared 0.647 0.658 0.663 0.696 0.208 0.208 0.209 0.193
Adj R-squared 0.622 0.633 0.637 0.673 0.152 0.150 0.147 0.130
Pseudo R-squared 0.454 0.119
Robust p values in parentheses; * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
22Table 7: White-collar workers under central collective bargaining coverage: Regression analysis
of mean and dispersion of logarithmised gross hourly wage in the manufacturing sector, Baden-
Wuerttemberg, October 2001 (Source: Salary and Wage Structure Survey 2001)
mean of log gross hourly wage standard deviation of log gross hourly wage
OLS robust median OLS robust median
Variables ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) regression regression ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) regression regression
age / 10 0.002 0.004 0.281 0.451 0.571 0.068 0.068 0.212 0.263 0.304
(0.913) (0.833) (0.024)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
(age/10)2 -0.034 -0.055 -0.069 -0.016 -0.025 -0.027
(0.018)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.005)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
tenure / 10 0.044 0.042 0.037 0.002 -0.004 -0.009 -0.009 0.037 0.003 0.021
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.339) (0.929) (0.923) (0.374) (0.377) (0.146) (0.885) (0.223)
(tenure/10)2 0.003 0.014 0.015 -0.009 0.001 -0.004
(0.785) (0.071)* (0.169) (0.123) (0.802) (0.233)
years of education 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.025 0.028 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.005
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.319) (0.320) (0.421) (0.024)** (0.017)**
share of female workers -0.170 -0.169 -0.164 -0.170 -0.173 0.019 0.019 0.008 0.017 0.007
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.397) (0.397) (0.700) (0.271) (0.585)
share of employees 0.810 0.824 0.781 0.467 0.473 -0.191 -0.191 -0.174 -0.376 -0.264
with specialized knowledge (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.038)** (0.037)** (0.048)** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
share of employees 0.820 0.833 0.796 0.465 0.444 -0.246 -0.246 -0.229 -0.424 -0.324
with self-employed activity (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.008)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
share of employees 0.541 0.555 0.528 0.218 0.215 -0.147 -0.147 -0.142 -0.341 -0.240
w/o decision-making power (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.012)** (0.112) (0.110) (0.106) (0.000)*** (0.000)***
remuneration for technical activity 0.027 0.026 0.020 0.030 0.027 0.008 0.008 0.013 0.009 0.007
(0.182) (0.204) (0.316) (0.070)* (0.236) (0.616) (0.616) (0.373) (0.453) (0.474)
Sunday working 0.131 0.139 0.130 0.119 0.136 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.014 0.012
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.012)** (0.031)** (0.722) (0.726) (0.706) (0.699) (0.684)
night work 0.025 0.019 0.026 0.011 -0.014 -0.045 -0.045 -0.053 -0.044 -0.046
(0.486) (0.590) (0.459) (0.786) (0.801) (0.190) (0.192) (0.110) (0.148) (0.072)*
ﬁrms with 200 to 499 employees 0.022 0.023 0.021 0.015 -0.000 -0.002 -0.010 -0.014
(0.092)* (0.081)* (0.039)** (0.275) (0.963) (0.788) (0.153) (0.024)**
ﬁrms with 500 to 999 employees 0.009 0.024 0.022 0.022 0.008 0.012 0.011 0.006 -0.012 -0.013
(0.570) (0.179) (0.230) (0.067)* (0.624) (0.199) (0.279) (0.562) (0.170) (0.074)*
ﬁrms with more than 1000 employees 0.021 0.037 0.035 0.033 0.035 0.005 0.005 0.003 -0.009 -0.009
(0.063)* (0.012)** (0.013)** (0.005)*** (0.032)** (0.443) (0.581) (0.773) (0.298) (0.230)
dummy CBA with opening clauses -0.017 -0.017 -0.015 -0.027 -0.026 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.016 0.014
(0.305) (0.303) (0.348) (0.050)* (0.179) (0.337) (0.338) (0.335) (0.111) (0.085)*
Constant 1.911 1.886 1.378 1.420 1.163 0.320 0.320 0.284 0.490 0.379
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 468 468 468 468 468 462 462 462 462 462
R-squared 0.701 0.703 0.709 0.783 0.214 0.214 0.240 0.393
Adj R-squared 0.682 0.683 0.689 0.767 0.163 0.161 0.185 0.349
Pseudo R-squared 0.535 0.174





Nr. 1  
Das Einstiegsgeld – eine zielgruppenorientierte negative Einkommensteuer: Konzeption, 
Umsetzung und eine erste Zwischenbilanz nach 15 Monaten in Baden-Württemberg 
Sabine Dann / Andrea Kirchmann / Alexander Spermann / Jürgen Volkert 
 
Nr. 2  
Die Einkommensteuerreform 1990 als natürliches Experiment. Methodische und 
konzeptionelle Aspekte zur Schätzung der Elastizität des zu versteuernden Einkommens  
Peter Gottfried / Hannes Schellhorn  
 
Nr. 3 
Gut betreut in den Arbeitsmarkt? Eine mikroökonomische Evaluation der  
Mannheimer Arbeitsvermittlungsagentur 
Jürgen Jerger / Christian Pohnke / Alexander Spermann 
 
Nr. 4 
Das IAW-Einkommenspanel und das Mikrosimulationsmodell SIMST 
Peter Gottfried / Hannes Schellhorn 
 
Nr. 5  
A Microeconometric Characterisation of Household Consumption Using  
Quantile Regression  
Niels Schulze / Gerd Ronning 
 
Nr. 6 
Determinanten des Überlebens von Neugründungen in der baden-württembergischen 




Die Baulandausweisungsumlage als ökonomisches Steuerungsinstrument einer 
nachhaltigkeitsorientierten Flächenpolitik  
Raimund Krumm 
 
Nr. 8  
Making Work Pay: U.S. American Models for a German Context? 
Laura Chadwick, Jürgen Volkert Nr. 9  
Erste Ergebnisse von vergleichenden Untersuchungen mit anonymisierten und nicht 
anonymisierten Einzeldaten am Beispiel der Kostenstrukturerhebung und der 
Umsatzsteuerstatistik 
Martin Rosemann  
 
Nr. 10  
Randomized Response and the Binary Probit Model 
Gerd Ronning  
 
Nr. 11  
Creating Firms for a New Century: Determinants of Firm Creation around 1900 
Joerg Baten  
 
Nr. 12  
Das fiskalische BLAU-Konzept zur Begrenzung des Siedlungsflächenwachstums  
Raimund Krumm 
 
Nr. 13  
Generelle Nichtdiskontierung als Bedingung für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung? 
Stefan Bayer 
 
Nr. 14  
Die Elastizität des zu versteuernden Einkommens. Messung und erste Ergebnisse zur 
empirischen Evidenz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland.  
Peter Gottfried / Hannes Schellhorn 
 
Nr. 15  
Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Marginal Tax Rates on Income – The German 
Case  
Peter Gottfried / Hannes Schellhorn 
 
Nr. 16  
Shadow Economies around the World: What do we really know? 
Friedrich Schneider 
  
Nr. 17  
Firm Foundations in the Knowledge Intensive Business Service Sector. Results from 
a Comparative Empirical Study in Three German Regions 
Andreas Koch / Thomas Stahlecker Nr. 18  
The impact of functional integration and spatial proximity on the post-entry 
performance of knowledge intensive business service firms 
Andreas Koch /  Harald Strotmann 
 
Nr. 19  
Legislative Malapportionment and the Politicization of Germany’s Intergovernmental 
Transfer System  
Hans Pitlik / Friedrich Schneider / Harald Strotmann 
 
Nr. 20  




Determinants of Innovative Activity in Newly Founded Knowledge Intensive 
Business Service Firms 
Andreas Koch / Harald Strotmann 
 
Nr. 22 
Impact of Opening Clauses on Bargained Wages 
Wolf Dieter Heinbach  